Sovereign · seven stress signals
Korea: 0 of 7 available stress signals on, latest values
Cite
Cite this view
datasteg (2026), “Sovereign stress signals: Korea”, datasteg money-flow, release 20261102.2, method 1.5, 2 November 2026, https://money-flow.datasteg.com/en/sovereign?r=20261102.2.
Figure note: Source: datasteg money-flow (release 20261102.2, method 1.5), from IMF WEO, IMF BOP, IMF IIP, BIS CBS, IMF IRFCL and OECD long-term rates via FRED.
BibTeX
@misc{datasteg:mf:sovereign-KOR:20261102.2,
author = {{datasteg}},
title = {Sovereign stress signals: Korea},
howpublished = {datasteg money-flow, release 20261102.2, method 1.5},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-11-02},
url = {https://money-flow.datasteg.com/en/sovereign?r=20261102.2},
urldate = {2026-11-02},
note = {Positions from IMF WEO, IMF BOP, IMF IIP, BIS CBS, IMF IRFCL, OECD long-term rates via FRED}
}The datasets' own citations (6)
- International Monetary Fund (2026), World Economic Outlook database, retrieved 2 November 2026, https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.RES:WEO.
- International Monetary Fund (2026), Balance of Payments, retrieved 27 October 2026, https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA:BOP.
- International Monetary Fund (2026), International Investment Position, retrieved 27 October 2026, https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA:IIP.
- Bank for International Settlements (2026), Consolidated banking statistics, retrieved 30 October 2026, https://data.bis.org/topics/CBS.
- International Monetary Fund (2026), International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity, retrieved 29 October 2026, https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA:IRFCL.
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2026), Federal Reserve statistical releases (H.4.1, H.6), retrieved from FRED, retrieved 31 October 2026, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The method's citation
datasteg (2026), “Money-flow methodology”, version 1.5, datasteg money-flow, 2 November 2026, https://money-flow.datasteg.com/en/method?v=1.5.
@misc{datasteg:mf:method:1.5,
author = {{datasteg}},
title = {Money-flow methodology},
howpublished = {datasteg money-flow, version 1.5},
year = {2026},
date = {2026-11-02},
url = {https://money-flow.datasteg.com/en/method?v=1.5},
urldate = {2026-11-02}
}Which of seven fiscal, external and market thresholds an economy has crossed, year by year, beside its past programmes and defaults · release 20261102.2 · method 1.5 · Updated 2 Nov 2026, 22:57 KST · IMF WEO, October 2026 · A count of signals, not a forecast.
How to read this · limits
Three steps to a government financing stop
1. It spends or borrows more than it earns
The government runs a deficit, or the whole country buys more from abroad than it sells and borrows the difference.
R4, R5 and R6 watch this step.
2. The debt starts growing on its own
Once the interest rate on the debt is above the growth of the economy, the debt grows faster than the income that pays it, even with no new spending.
R1, R2 and R3 watch this step.
3. Lenders stop rolling it over
Lenders ask for more interest, then refuse to lend again when old loans fall due. Someone has to step in: the IMF, euro-area partners, or a default.
R4, R5, R6 and R7 watch this step.
What this page cannot do
- It counts signals. It does not predict a default, and it is not a forecast.
- A country can cross many lines without distress. Greece today has very high debt, but most of it is owed to euro-area governments on long, cheap terms, so markets are not asked to roll it over.
- A country can also run into distress with few lines crossed. Korea in 1997 had small government debt; its trouble was short-term foreign bank loans, which fiscal rules miss.
Every year comes from the newest IMF World Economic Outlook (latest vintage), revisions included. Past signals therefore look sharper here than they were at the time.
How to read the charts: the line is the value, the dashed line is the threshold, red dots are years the rule was on, shaded bands are past bailouts or defaults, dashed ends are projections.
Now · Korea
0 of 7 available rules on · A count of signals, not a forecast.
| Rule | Value | As of | Threshold | Use | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fiscal R1–R3 | |||||
| R1 Debt level | 52.4% | 2025 | off | ||
| R2 Deficit | −2.3% | 2025 | off | ||
| R3 Debt snowball | 0.2% | 2025 | off | ||
| External R4–R6 | |||||
| R4 Current account | 4.7% | 2025 | off | ||
| R5 Net IIP | 48% | 2025 | off | ||
| R6 Liquidity | 44% | 2025 | off | ||
| Market R7 | |||||
| R7 Spread | −0.6 pp | Sep 2026 12 months | off | ||
Source: IMF WEO; IMF BOP; IMF IIP; BIS CBS; IMF IRFCL; EU MIP scoreboard; OECD long-term rates via FRED. Calculations: datasteg money-flow, method 1.5: rules R22 R23 R24 R25 R26 R27 R28, checks V24, V25, V26.
Signal count by year
- count ≥ K
- count < K
- available rules
- K = 4
- projection
Legend
- value
- threshold
- rule on
- projection
- IMF programme
- Euro-area or EU programme
- Default or restructuring
- Precautionary line (not distress)
Hover to see a year on every chart. Click to pin it; ← → move it; Esc returns to the latest values. How to read the charts: the line is the value, the dashed line is the threshold, red dots are years the rule was on, shaded bands are past bailouts or defaults, dashed ends are projections.
Episodes: Korea
| Type | What | From | To |
|---|---|---|---|
| IMF programme | IMF Stand-By Arrangement · source | 1997-12-04 | 2000-12-03 |
Source: IMF lending arrangements; ESM and EU programmes; BoC–BoE default database. Episodes are hand-checked in config/sovereign_episodes.yaml, one source each.